This study of familial patterns of moral judgment compares relationships between parent and offspring moral reasoning from early adolescence to adulthood in a cross-sectional sample from the Oakland Growth Study (Jones, 1939a (Jones, , 1939b ) and a longitudinal sample from 20-year study of moral judgment development. The findings presented here are part of an expanding body of cognitive-developmental research on the role of parents and family processes in the development of moral judgment.
In his classic "Stage and Sequence" paper, Kohlberg (1969) described the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization and his six-stage model of moral judgment development. Strongly influenced by Piaget's (1932 Piaget's ( /1965 ) theory of cognitive development, Kohlberg focused on moral cognition and viewed moral development as a process of increasing differentiation and integration of perspectives of self and other in resolving moral conflict. Accordingly, Kohlberg's approach to socialization emphasized the importance of social experiences that produce cognitive disequilibrium, challenge and reveal inadequacies in the child's reasoning, provide exposure to higher stage reasoning, and encourage social perspective taking.
Like Piaget (1932 Piaget ( /1965 , Kohlberg (1969) downplayed the role of the family in the development of moral reasoning and Betsy Speicher, Harvard University (now at Clinical Developmental Institute, Belmont, Massachusetts) .
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Betsy Speicher, 11 Trotting Horse Drive, Lexington, Massachusetts 02173. focused on the peer group and schools. He argued that parent moral reasoning should neither limit nor be related to the stage attained by offspring. According to Kohlberg, neither family participation nor identification with parents is critically necessary for moral development; the family is merely one of several social institutions that promote moral development through the creation of "role-taking opportunities" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 399) . As suggested by Powers (1988) , this theoretical position stemmed from an attempt to distinguish cognitive-developmental theory from psychoanalytic and social-learning approaches that focused on parents as the primary contributors to a child's moral socialization.
Perhaps as a result of Kohlberg's (1969) theoretical bias against families, there has been relatively little research exploring the contribution of the family to the development of moral judgment. However, as cognitive-developmental researchers increasingly explore the role of family factors in the development of children's moral reasoning, there is a growing body of empirical evidence that Kohlberg had underestimated the importance of the family. The confluence of results suggests that, in both cognitive and affective domains, reported and observed parental behavior is related to their children's moral reasoning.
In the cognitive domain, studies comparing relationships between various discipline techniques and children's moral reasoning indicate that advanced moral reasoning is most consistently related to reported parental use of other-oriented inductive discipline, that is, cognitive techniques that emphasize reasoning, encourage the child to take perspectives of others, and rationally teach the child to understand the consequences of actions (Buck, Walsh, & Rothman, 1981; Holstein, 1972; Parikh, 1980; Shoffeitt, 1971) . Results of observational studies examining relationships between family interaction styles and children's moral reasoning provide support for both the importance of family environmental factors and the cognitive-developmental view that moral development is promoted by role-taking opportunities, including parent encouragement of their child's participation in family discussions (Holstein, 1969; Par-ikh, 1980) , parent use of reasoning (Buck etal, 1981) , and parent discussion styles that elicit and re-present the reasoning of others (Walker & Taylor, 1991) .
In the affective domain, the role of positive family relationships was first suggested by studies exploring connections between children's moral reasoning and self-report measures of parent affection and involvement (Fodor, 1973; Hart, 1988; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; Holstein, 1969; Parikh, 1980; Shoffeitt, 1971; Speicher, 1992) . These studies consistently found relationships between children's moral reasoning and parent warmth or involvement. In Kohlberg's (1958) own longitudinal sample, Hart (1988) found that reported paternal affection and involvement, measured during adolescence, predicted sons' moral judgment during childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. Results of observational studies also have consistently found an association between positive parent-child interaction, for example, parental warmth (Buck et al., 1981) , low maternal hostility (Jurkovic & Prentice, 1974) , maternal affective support (Powers, 1982 (Powers, /1983 , and high parent supportive interactions (Walker & Taylor, 1991) and moral judgment maturity.
The final aspect of the family social environment studied by cognitive-developmental researchers is the parents' own moral reasoning. As noted by Powers (1988) , parent moral reasoning is seen as a potentially important aspect of the family social environment for two reasons. First, experimental research has shown that moral reasoning is stimulated by exposure to optimal ranges of higher stage thinking (Berkowitz, Gibbs, & Broughton, 1980; Rest, Turiel, &Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1966; Walker, 1982) . Therefore, it seems reasonable to examine whether there is a relationship between parent and child moral judgment because parents whose own moral judgment development is more advanced than that of their children should be better able to stimulate moral reasoning by exposing children to more complex moral arguments. Second, parent moral judgment may be related to child-rearing philosophy and behavior.
Research results indicate that higher stage parents are significantly more likely than lower stage parents to report the use of cognitive methods of moral transmission and democratic family decision making (Speicher-Dubin, 1982) ; to encourage their children's participation in moral discussions (Holstein, 1969; Parikh, 1975) ; and to be supportive, sharing, and challenging in family discussions (Powers, 1982 (Powers, /1983 . It seems likely that both differential parent behavior and moral reasoning contribute to hypothesized relationships between parent and offspring moral judgment at various points in a child's development.
Although previous studies of family moral judgment patterns found some significant relationships, results were inconsistent and varied depending on the age of the offspring and the sex of the parents and children (Buck et al., 1981; Dunton, 1988 Dunton, / 1989 Haan, Langer, & Kohlberg, 1976; Holstein, 1969 Holstein, , 1975 Parikh, 1980; Powers, 1982 Powers, /1983 Shoffeitt, 1971; Walker & Taylor, 1991) . Inconsistencies across studies outweighed consistent patterns, and there were serious methodological weaknesses in many of the studies, including the use of unreliable and unstandardized versions of Kohlberg's (1958) scoring system, data analyses that unnecessarily reduced variability of scores, and inconsistent use of control variables such as age, IQ, socioeconomic status (SES), sex, and education in the research designs. Even among the studies that used the final, published Standard Issue moral judgment scoring system , consistent patterns did not emerge (Dunton; /1989 Powers, 1982 Powers, /1983 Walker & Taylor, 1991) .
The present study is a reanalysis of cross-sectional parentoffspring moral judgment data from the Oakland Growth Study (OGS), previously reported by Haan et al. (1976) , and an analysis of parent-offspring moral judgment data from Kohlberg's (1958) longitudinal study. Research methodology has been improved in three ways. First, all of the moral judgment data were scored according to the final standardized and published Standard Form Scoring system . Second, potentially confounding variables such as age, sex, cognitive stage, IQ, SES, and education were controlled in the data analyses. Third, comparisons of longitudinal and cross-sectional family moral judgment relationships permitted an exploration of consistent patterns of results.
The purpose of this study was to describe family patterns of moral reasoning across age and sex groups and to explore crosssectional and longitudinal consistencies in the patterns of results. Although a correlational approach does not reveal how parents actually reason with their children (Walker & Taylor, 1991) , a description of developmental patterns can suggest directions for more explanatory research.
Method

Subjects
The subjects from the OGS, a longitudinal study begun by Jones (1939a Jones ( , 1939b , were all lower-to upper-middle-class White natives of California and included 82 mothers and 75 fathers from the original longitudinal sample, and 100 male and 100 female offspring. There were 98 adolescent offspring (ages 10 to 18 years) and 102 early adult offspring (ages 19 to 31 years). All of the subjects were interviewed with the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview by researchers at the Institute of Human Development, University of California, Berkeley, during a follow-up wave in 1969/1970. A small subset was reinterviewed in 1975. Although the OGS parent cohort was followed longitudinally, the present sample is cross-sectional because the offspring ranged in age from 10 to 31 years and most of the subjects were interviewed only during the 1969/1970 follow-up wave.
A comparison of the educational and occupational attainment of male and female parents shows fairly wide disparities between the two groups. A majority (60%) of the male parents were college graduates, whereas an overwhelming majority (83%) of the female parents had not graduated from college. Similarly, almost half of the male parents were professionally employed; a subtantial majority (79%) of the female parents were either clerical and sales personnel or were unemployed.
The subjects from Kohlberg's (1958) longitudinal study of moral judgment development included 21 males whose parents (19 mothers and 18 fathers) completed moral judgment interviews in 1959. The original Kohlberg sample consisted of three age groups: 10-, 13-, and 16-year-olds. Although moral judgment interviews were administered six times at 3-year intervals since 1955, the number of interviews per subject varied.
Socioeconomically, the present Kohlberg sample included 8 subjects with lower-middle-class backgrounds and 13 subjects with upper-middle-class backgrounds. Educational and occupational attainment of the female parents was not available. All of the subjects were White residents of the suburbs of Chicago.
Measures
Moral judgment. Moral judgment was measured from responses to the semistructured Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview, which consists of hypothetical dilemmas and a series of probing questions designed to elicit the structure of the individual's moral reasoning. All moral judgment interviews were scored blind according to the Standard Issue Scoring System , which is both a reliable and valid psychometric measure. presented strong evidence of the reliability (test-retest, interrater, and alternate form) and construct validity of the Standard Issue Scoring System.
The manual contains stage descriptions and prototypic responses for the five moral judgment stages. At Stage 1, which is normative during middle childhood, morality is equated with avoidance of punishment and obedience to rules and authority for its own sake. Older children and early adolescents typically reason at Stage 2 and view morality from a concrete individualistic perspective in which right action is relativistic and involves serving one individual's interests, or making concrete exchanges. The primary concerns at Stage 3, which usually develops during adolescence, are maintaining interpersonal relationships, following the golden rule, living up to the expectations of others, being a good person with good motives, and so on. At Stage 4, the individual takes a broad societal, rather than individual or interpersonal, perspective in making moral judgments and assesses the effects of actions on the social system. Finally, at Stage 5 the individual takes a prior-to-society perspective and judges the morality of actions in terms of upholding universal human rights and the social contract, and maximizing social utility and welfare.
Most of the Kohlberg sample interviews were scored by the same three experienced raters whose reliability was reported by ; interviews of 3 subjects were cases used in the construction of the manual. All other moral judgment interviews were scored by the investigator, one of the three raters who coded the Kohlberg longitudinal data.
Interrater reliability for the OGS moral judgment data was obtained from a subset of 30 parent and offspring interviews that were independently scored according to the manual. Standard issue scoring of Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interviews yields two types of scores. One is a nine-integer stage score ranging from Stages 1 to 5 and including 4 transitional stages (e.g., Stage 3/4). The other is a weighted average score (WAS), which is a continuous score, ranging from 100 to 500, that is derived from a weighted average of all scorable responses in an interview multiplied by 100. Eighty-seven percent of the nine-integer stage scores were within one third of a stage. The Pearson product moment correlation, based on continuous WAS, was .92 and was comparable with correlations reported by .
Background variables. In the OGS sample, intelligence was assessed by the individually administered Wechsler-Bellveau Intelligence Scales, and in the Kohlberg sample, intelligence was measured from group IQ tests (e.g., the Otis Group Intelligence Scale and the Thurstone Primary Mental Abilities Test). Social class of OGS male and female parents was measured by the Hollingshead Index of Social Position (Hollingshead & Redlich, 1958) . In the Kohlberg sample, social class was a dichotomous measure (upper-middle-class and lower-middleclass) based on the educational and occupational level of the male parent. Job status was based on the 7-point Hollingshead scale. For Kohlberg subjects, education was measured in years, and for OGS subjects, education was measured by the Hollingshead Education Scale. In the OGS sample, cognitive stage was measured from three Piagetian tests adapted from Inhelder and Piaget (1958) and scored by Institute of Human Development researchers by a scoring system described by Kuhn, Kohlberg, Langer, and Haan (1977) .
Design
Parent-offspring moral judgment data from the cross-sectional OGS study and from Kohlberg's longitudinal study were analyzed separately, and the patterns of relationships were compared during adolescence (ages lOto 18) and early adulthood (ages 19 to 33). These two age ranges were selected for two reasons. First, the number of subjects in the two groups was approximately equal and the sample size in each of the two age groups was sufficiently large to permit control of background variables. Second, because normative middle-class adolescents typically begin the maturational process of establishing physical independence from parents during the college years, the inclusion of 19-year-olds in the young adult group was reasonable from a developmental perspective.
Parent-offspring moral judgment correlations were analyzed separately for each sex and age group. That is, for each of the two age groups, there was an analysis of father-son, mother-son, father-daughter, and mother-daughter moral judgment relationships. When background variables (age, parent SES, offspring education, IQ, and cognitive stage) were significantly related to offspring moral judgment in a particular age or sex group, these variables were controlled in analyses of relationships between parent and offspring moral judgment.
Results
Relationships Between the Background Variables and Offspring Moral Judgment
Correlations between background variables and offspring moral reasoning can be found in Tables 1 and 2 . With the exception of age, which was strongly related to moral reasoning during late childhood and adolescence but unrelated to moral reasoning during adulthood, correlations between background variables and moral judgment in the OGS sample generally increased between adolescence and adulthood. For example, whereas none of the correlations between cognitive stage and moral judgment was significant between ages 10 and 18, there were significant relationships between these two variables among both males and females during adulthood. Similarly, correlations among intelligence, parent SES, and moral judgment were lowest in the adolescent OGS age group and highest in the adult group. Increasing correlations between intelligence and moral judgment in the male Kohlberg sample is consistent with patterns seen in the OGS sample. The only inconsistency across samples was a developmental pattern of decreasing correlations between fathers' SES and moral judgment among Kohlberg sample sons.
Relationships Between Parent and Offspring Moral Reasoning
Zero-order and partial correlations between parent and offspring moral reasoning in the OGS cross-sectional sample and Kohlberg longitudinal sample during adolescence and early adulthood appear in Tables 3, 4 , 5, and 6. In the OGS sample, results were highly consistent across sex and age groups. During both adolescence and young adulthood, there were moderate, significant correlations between parent and offspring moral reasoning both when sex groups were combined and when correlations for boys and girls were analyzed separately. In the Kohlberg sample, there were also positive associations between parent and son moral judgment, although the only significant findings were correlations between father and son moral judgment among the young adults.
Significant relationships between parent and offspring moral reasoning were further analyzed in a series of partial correlations and multiple regressions, with the effects of background variables that were significantly related to offspring moral reasoning in a given sex and age group controlled. In the Kohlberg young adult sample, these analyses entailed partial correlations within 3-year age groups (see Table 6 ). This approach avoided inclusion of repeated measures from the same longitudinal subjects in a single analysis. In the larger OGS cross-sectional sample, background variables that were significantly related to offspring moral judgment were controlled by entering these variables first in multiple regressions equations. With background variables and sex controlled, further consistent patterns in the two samples emerged. For example, when sex groups in the adolescent OGS sample were combined, both mothers', F(3,82) = 3.06,p < .05, and fathers', F(3,82) = 3.24/> < .05, moral judgment significantly predicted adolescent moral reasoning after age and IQ were controlled. However, when family moral judgment relationships were analyzed within each sex group, gender differences were revealed. Whereas both mothers', F(3, 37) = 3.82, p < .025, and fathers', F(3, 37) = 3.38, p < .025, moral judgment significantly predicted daughters' moral judgment after age and IQ were controlled, neither parents' moral judgment was a significant predictor of sons' moral judgment after age was controlled (see Tables 3 and 4 ). These latter findings among adolescent OGS boys are consistent with the nonsignificant parent-son correlations in the Kohlberg sample (see Table 5 ).
During early adulthood, the findings in the two samples also showed similar patterns after background variables were controlled. As shown in Table 5 , there were positive relationships between mother and son moral judgment in the Kohlberg sample, but the correlations were not significant. Likewise, after background variables in the OGS sample were controlled, mothers' moral reasoning did not significantly predict offspring moral judgment in either sex group or when sex groups were combined (see Table 3 ). Mothers' moral judgment did not significantly increase the proportion of explained variance in offspring moral judgment after education, IQ, cognitive stage, and fathers' SES were controlled in the adult male group, F(5, 19) = .392, or after education and IQ were controlled in the adult female group, F(3, 35) = .585. Relationships between father and son moral judgment in the two young adult samples were also strikingly similar. In the Kohlberg sample, father-son correlations were significant in the combined age-19-to-33 adult Kohlberg group (in which there were longitudinal repeated measures at 3-year intervals for most subjects), and in each of four 3-year age groups (without repeated measures). Zero-order correlations within the 3-year age groups ranged from .59 to .96. As Table 6 indicates, partial correlations between father and son moral judgment in the adult Kohlberg age groups were in the moderate (.42) to high (.95) range even after the effects of background variables were controlled.
The strength of fathers' moral judgment as a predictor of the adult moral reasoning of the Kohlberg subjects can be further demonstrated by the proportion of variance in sons' moral judgment explained by fathers' moral judgment after other variables were controlled. Among subjects in their early 20s, fathers' moral judgment explained 28% of the variance in sons' moral reasoning after fathers' job and education were controlled, and 40% of the variance after fathers' SES and education were controlled. After controlling for IQ and education, fathers' moral judgment explained 48% of the variance among subjects in their late 20s.
As in the Kohlberg sample, fathers' moral judgment continued to be a strong predictor of adult sons' moral judgment after background variables were controlled in the OGS adult male sample. Fathers' moral judgment remained a significant predictor of sons' moral judgment after IQ, education, cognitive stage, and fathers' SES were controlled, F(5, 19) = 3.52, p < .025, and increased the amount of explained variance from 56% to 63%.
Fathers' moral judgment was also significantly related to moral reasoning of adult daughters. Although education was consistently a strong predictor of moral reasoning maturity during adulthood, fathers' moral judgment significantly increased the explained moral judgment variance in female offspring after education and IQ were controlled, F(3, 27) = 4.21, p < .025, and in the combined male and female sample, after education, cognitive stage, fathers' SES, mothers' SES, and IQ were controlled, F(6, 37) = 3.41, p< .01. Differences in the relative contribution of mothers' versus fathers' moral judgment as predictors of offspring moral judgment during adulthood may, in part, be related to wide disparities in educational and occupational attainment and in distributions of moral judgment stages among male and female parents. Only 2% of the OGS mothers and none of the mothers in the Kohlberg sample were reasoning at Stage 4 or Stage 4/5 Note. Because of the small number of subjects in each of the adult age groups and the extremely high correlations coefficients required to achieve statistical significance, all background variables that had a greater than .40 correlation with sons' moral judgment were included in the partial correlations. SES = socioeconomic status. *p<.05. **p<.01.
compared with 35% of the OGS fathers and 17% of the Kohlberg fathers. In both samples there were also significant differences in WAS and in variability of scores. Among OGS fathers, the mean WAS was 365 compared with 325 among mothers, 4374) = 9.02, p < .05, two-tailed, and there were significant differences in variance, F( 181, 193) = 1.11, p < .05, two-tailed. The mean WAS of Kohlberg sample fathers and mothers were 344 and 321, respectively, t(35) = 2.10, p< .05, two-tailed, and there were also significant differences in variability, F( 17, 18) = 2.94, p < .05, two-tailed. These sex differences must be taken into account when interpreting family patterns of moral reasoning.
Limitation on Development
In support of Kohlberg's (1969) theoretical expectations, results from both samples clearly indicate that parent moral judgment did not limit the adult stage attained by offspring. Among OGS adult offspring, 30% exceeded their mothers' moral stage; 24% exceeded their fathers' stage; and 22% exceeded the moral stage of both parents. In the Kohlberg sample, after age 22, 53% of the adult children had exceeded the moral stage of both parents. Graduation from college, however, was a critical factor in determining which subjects developed postconventional (Stage 5) reasoning and which subjects achieved more advanced moral reasoning than their parents. All of the subjects who exceeded the moral stage of both parents had graduated from college. Ninety percent of the principled subjects had conventional (Stages 3 and 4) parents, but all had graduated from college.
Discussion
Across both the Kohlberg longitudinal sample and the OGS cross-sectional sample, there were numerous positive associations between parent and offspring moral judgment. Consistent family patterns of moral reasoning were found in the two samples when both sex and background variables were controlled. Developmental patterns indicated that, during adolescence, parent moral judgment was related to offspring moral reasoning but was a stronger predictor among girls than among boys; among young adults, fathers' moral judgment and education were the strongest predictors of both sons' and daughters' moral reasoning; but education, not parent moral reasoning, limited the moral stage attained by offspring.
The finding that there were very similar patterns of family moral reasoning in the two samples after both sex and background variables were controlled underscores the importance of controlling for potentially confounding variables and helps to explain inconsistencies in much of the previous research. For example, Walker and Taylor (1991) found positive but nonsignificant trends in parent-child moral judgment correlations in a sample of 6-to 16-year-olds, but they did not control for age. Given the present finding that age was the strongest predictor of adolescent moral reasoning (see Table 1 ), it is possible that Walker and Taylor's results were confounded by age. During early adulthood, age was unrelated to moral reasoning; the strongest predictors were education and fathers' moral reasoning. It is noteworthy that in both the Kohlberg longitudinal sample and the OGS cross-sectional sample, fathers' moral reason-ing remained significantly related to their adult children's reasoning after education and other background variables that were significantly correlated with moral judgment were controlled.
Although consistent family moral judgment patterns found in this study cannot explain the mechanisms of development, the findings can be interpreted theoretically, and in conjunction with other empirical evidence, to generate hypotheses for future research. For example, sex differences in the relative strength of parental moral judgment in predicting offspring moral reasoning may be related to stage disparity between parents and children. In support of Kohlberg's theoretical claim that cognitive conflict is the mechanism that promotes moral judgment development, Walker and Taylor (1991) found that a relatively large, one-stage difference between parent and child moral reasoning was predictive of development over a 2-year period, and that parents provide maximal exposure to higher stage reasoning by accommodating their moral reasoning to that of their child during moral discussions. Given these results, it seems likely that the relative strength of mothers' moral judgment as a predictor of child moral judgment during adolescence and of fathers' moral judgment as a predictor of offspring moral stage in adulthood may be related to sex differences in parent moral judgment. Mothers in both samples were significantly lower in stage of moral reasoning, and their moral judgment evidenced significantly less variability than their male counterparts. During adolescence, when subjects in both samples were in a transition between Stages 2 and 3, the Stage 3 and Stage 3/4 reasoning of their mothers may have been optimally discrepant to stimulate development. In early adulthood, when Stages 4 and 5 reasoning was developing, fathers' moral judgment was a strong predictor and may have been optimally discrepant.
Sex differences in parent-child moral judgment relationships during adolescence are unexplainable from a cognitive-developmental perspective. With age controlled, neither parents' moral judgment was significantly related to sons' moral judgment in the two adolescent samples. Daughters' adolescent patterns were quite different: There were significant relationships between the moral reasoning of both parents and their daughters. These results may reflect differential sex role socialization, as Conger's (1977) assertion that boys have traditionally received more cultural support for independence and assertiveness whereas girls are expected to be dependent and compliant has strong empirical support (Block, 1983; Saegert & Hart, 1976 , cited in Ruble, 1988 Zern, 1984) . The OGS adolescent girls may have been more dependent on parents and amenable to parental influence.
The finding that family patterns of moral reasoning change with development supports a stage-environment fit hypothesis (Eccles et al., 1993) and suggests that environmental factors that stimulate development may change as children mature. As previously noted, there is increasing empirical evidence of a connection between positive intrafamilial relationships and the development of moral reasoning during adolescence. In a self-report study of a subset of OGS adolescents, Speicher (1992) found that adolescent moral judgment was most consistently related to adolescent perceptions of affectively positive family relationships, family communication, and parent understanding and support. Contrary to the expectations of cognitive-developmental theory, moral reasoning during adolescence was unrelated to reports of democratic, child-participatory family structures and decision making. Consistent with these results, the observational studies of Walker and Taylor (1991) and Powers (1982 Powers ( /1983 both indicated that moral judgment development was negatively associated with affective conflict but positively associated with interactions that were affectively supportive and that encouraged perspective taking.
Although affective and interpersonal factors in the family environment may have an important role in the consolidation of Stage 3 reasoning during adolescence, the finding that graduation from college was a critical factor in the adult stage of moral judgment, and that education was one of the strongest predictors of moral judgment among adult offspring, suggests that cognitive and intellectual stimulation may optimally promote development during early adulthood. A strong relationship between higher education and advanced moral judgment also has been reported by , Rest and Narvaez (1991) , Rest and Thoma (1985) , Walker (1986) , and White (1988) . Normative developmental processes during the young adult and college years may also underlie both the strong relationship between education and moral judgment and between father and offspring moral judgment. The early adult years are of critical importance in the development of both ideological identity (Douvan & Adelson, 1966; Marcia, 1980) and values (Perry, 1970) ; and the development of moral reasoning and identity appear to be parallel processes (Marcia, 1980) . The challenge to previously held beliefs, values, and epistemology inherent in the college experience may stimulate the young adult's interest in examining and challenging parental beliefs, resulting in intrafamilial moral dialogue and increased parental, and particularly paternal, contribution to identity and moral judgment development. This interpretation is supported by Rest and Narvaez's (1991) conclusion that "one of the influences of the college experience is that it provides general intellectual stimulation that causes students to overhaul and rethink the basic ways in which they make moral judgments" (p. 239).
The father-son relationship appears to be important both in male identity development (Marcia, 1980) and in male moral judgment development, as suggested by the present results and by findings reported by Hart (1988) . Hart found that in Kohlberg's longitudinal sample, identification with mothers and maternal affection-involvement were unrelated to sons' moral judgment at any age. However, identification with fathers and paternal affection and involvement, measured during adolescence, significantly predicted sons' moral judgment from childhood to adulthood.
Interpretation of the stronger paternal role in the moral judgment development of adult offspring is problematic from both a cognitive-developmental and traditional socialization perspective. Kohlberg predicted weak parent-offspring moral judgment correlations during adulthood, whereas most socialization paradigms emphasize the role of the mother as the primary socialization agent. Hart (1988) argued that the most parsimonious interpretation to explain his results was the developmental process of identification, which also may have contributed to the strong father-son correlations in the present study. (Although a process of same-sex identification cannot ex-plain the strong father-daughter correlations, this cohort of female offspring may have identified with parental competence rather than sex.)
Recognizing that this interpretation is contrary to the expectations of cognitive-developmental theory, Hart (1988) and Gibbs and Schnell (1985) argued that different theoretical accounts, along with an empirically based understanding of normative developmental processes, may meaningfully complement each other in understanding the process of moral development. Kohlberg's (1969) constructivist approach, in this view, is not undermined by results that support conceptions of developmental processes proposed by other theoretical paradigms. In fact, the integration of various theoretical approaches, along with knowledge gleaned from developmental research, may result in more powerful explanations of underlying developmental processes than interpretations based on a single theoretical perspective.
